(3) Models have implicit functions and assumptions (e.g., Wimsatt, 2007; Winther, Forthcoming).
Four Functions oF mathematical modeling
The pragMaTic vieW helps us focus on the functions of mathematical models, including (1) unification of both models and data, (2) model fitting to data, (3) mechanism identification accounting for observation, and (4) prediction of future observations. uniFication Unification involves the integration and synthesis of disparate types of evidence and models. For instance, Darwin unified hybridization, developmental, paleontological, and biogeographical data under a single theory. in mathematical modeling, unification often entails embedding -a subsumption relation allowing for the unification of (i) various mathematical theories/ models and (ii) the data pertinent to those theories/models (Friedman, 1983; van Fraassen, 1989) .
model Fitting
Model fitting employs statistical procedures such as regression analysis and hypothesis testing. although fitting is essential for model verification, models can be over fitted to accommodate all of the data, a practice called "fudging" by Lipton (2005) introduction philosophy can shed light on mathematical modeling and the juxtaposition of modeling and empirical data. This paper explores three philosophical traditions of the structure of scientific theory -Syntactic, Semantic, and pragmatic -to show that each illuminates mathematical modeling. The pragmatic view identifies four critical functions of mathematical modeling: (1) unification of both models and data, (2) model fitting to data, (3) mechanism identification accounting for observation, and (4) prediction of future observations. Such facets are here explored using a recent exchange between two groups of mathematical modelers in plant biology. Scientific debate can arise from different philosophies of modeling.
PhilosoPhy oF science and models
Three distinct philosophical perspectives on the nature and dynamics of scientific theory were sequentially developed in the twentieth century. each was a critique of the previous perspective. each illuminates scientific modeling. The SynTacTic vieW (advocated by the vienna circle "Logical positivists") took issue with nineteenth century german idealism and argued that a scientific theory was actually a set of sentences expressed in a logical language L (e.g., carnap, 1928 /2003 Woodger, 1937; Hempel, 1966) . The language L consisted of inference rules (e.g., modus ponens) and logical terms (e.g., ∃, ¬) as well as two types of vocabulary: theoretical (e.g., "proton," "protein," or "proletariat") and observational (e.g., "hard," "liquid," or "blue"). Sentences could be of two forms -either theoretical (i.e., containing only theoretical vocabulary, or mixed, i.e., correspondence rules), or observational (i.e., containing no theoretical vocabulary and acquiring meaning only from experimental observations). semantic view: the mathematical structure oF scientiFic theory in the late 1950s and early 1960s, some philosophers of science critiqued the SynTacTic vieW and focused on the history and sociology of scientific practice (e.g., Thomas Kuhn, paul Feyerabend, n.r. Hanson). another group suggested that a philosophy of science should focus on mathematical models, rather than logical languages. van Fraassen, an innovative advocate of this SeManTic vieW remarked:
to present a theory, we define the class of its models directly, without paying any attention to questions of axiomatizability, in any special language, however relevant or simple or logically interesting that might be. and if the theory as such, is to be identified with anything at all -if theories are to be reified -then a theory should be identified with its class of models. (van Fraassen, 1989, p. 222) Models were "always a mathematical structure" (van Fraassen, 1970, p. 327; van Fraassen, 2008, p. 381) , and theory was a family of mathematical models. The SeManTic vieW explored the mathematical structure of science, including the hierarchy of models from high theory to phenomenological models (Suppes, 2002) and the nature of confirmation and validation (i.e., the correct semantics) of theoretical models (e.g., Lloyd, 1994) .
Pragmatic view: Functions and assumPtions in scientiFic theory
The perspectives on syntactic structures and semantic relations offered by the SynTacTic anD SeManTic vieWS are insufficient to describe scientific modeling because (1) practices, instruments, and experiments interweave with mathematical modeling (e.g., Hacking, 1983). (2) There are a variety of modeling syntaxes -mathematics, diagrams, narratives, simulations, and programs, etc. (e.g., Morgan and Morrison, 1999) .
Hence, the replication of patterns observed in nature does not guarantee that the mechanism that underlies it in the real world has been discovered or explained" (p. 101). put differently, a model can mimic reality for the wrong reasons. comparative analysis of distinct proposed mechanisms, including novel discriminating predictions is necessary.
conclusion
The preceding illustrates that no model can fully satisfy all the functions and virtues of modeling. For instance, every model is limited in scope and identifies only some mechanisms. There are tradeoffs among functions (Wimsatt, 2007) ; for instance, (1) unification comes at the price of model fitting and prediction, and (2) model fitting and mechanism identification are not always aligned. Because of these trade-offs, different researchers make distinct claims about which functions are primary and forget that a theory is often a family of mathematical models, with each model maximizing only some functions. Modelers should not become prisoners of their own abstractions (Levins and Lewontin, 1980, p. 67) , and should seek integration among reasonable models (Mitchell, 2003; Winther, 2011 can be addressed by the akaike information criterion (Hitchcock and Sober, 2004; see Winther, 2009 ).
mechanism identiFication
Mechanism identification uses various strategies, including (i) analysis (i.e., decomposition into constituent parts and processes, given a theoretical perspective), (ii) causal surgery (pearl, 2000) , and (iii) mechanism transplantation (see Winther, Forthcoming) . Mathematical models assist in these strategies, and hence in mechanism identification (Winther, 2011) .
Prediction
The relevance of an observation or datum for the testing, confirmation, and choice of mathematical models and theories is significantly greater if it is a novel prediction (e.g., popper, 1963; see Winther, 2009) . in this sense, an excellent prediction is surprising, validating, and correct.
a case study
The foregoing is illustrated with a debate between two camps of modelers, each focusing on different modeling functions. The possibility of collaboration rather than conflict is explored and advocated. if a meristem has a high veg, it continues to grow vegetatively. if it has a low level, it flowers. The model stipulates that levels of veg decrease over time and that meristems have one of two internal states: A or B. Meristems can be apical or lateral. in each, veg drops and induces flowering at two different times: T a and T B . Since lateral branches do not usually produce flowers (p. 1453), the model assumes that meristems in A revert to B. This "transience" model emulates flowering patterns that are related empirically to two Arabidopsis genes, TERMINAL FLOWER and LEAFY. it also mimics genetic experimental data. Álvarez-Buylla et al. (2007) present an alternative "toy model" inspired by Turing's (1952) morphogenesis model, wherein an activator auto-catalyzes and induces an inhibitor that inhibits the activator and diffuses more rapidly (see Winther, 2011) .
